JURISPRUDENCE AND PRUDENTIAL JUSTICE
Honorable Alan B. Handler*
"The wise in heart shall be called prudent."'
I.

EXPLANATIONS

Our state courts have become the object of expanding and
sharpening public commentary. Certain significant, highly visible, and very controversial decisions have served as a lightning
rod to draw that critical attention. Mt. Laurel II,2 expounding
governmental obligations to provide affordable housing, is such
a case. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 3 the social-host-liability case, and In re
Conroy, 4 the right-to-die case, are others. The earlier Robinson v.
Cahill cases, 5 addressing the constitutional adequacy of public education, serve the point that critical dialogue relating to the
* Associate Justice, New Jersey Supreme Court. A.B., Princeton University
1953; LL.B., Harvard Law School 1956.
This article is adapted from the Arthur T. Vanderbilt Lecture delivered before
the Harvard Law School Association of New Jersey on November 21, 1985. Reflecting its origins as a speech, while conceding to minimally appropriate attribution, the piece is lightly footnoted.
I have had the benefit of helpful review from several persons. I want specially
to acknowledge Janine Bauer, Esq., my law secretary during the 1984-1985 court
term, for her perceptive insights, and Harold L. Rubenstein, Esq., an attorney with
the New Jersey Supreme Court's administrative office and an adjunct professor of
philosophy at Rutgers University, for his scholarly criticism and deft guidance
through the abundant authority on the subject.
I Proverbs 16:21.
2 Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J.
158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983).
3 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
4 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
5 Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, modified, 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d
65, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973). In Robinson, the New Jersey Supreme Court
declared the state's public school financing scheme violative of the New Jersey Constitution's provision requiring "a thorough and efficient system" of public education. Id. at 515, 303 A.2d at 295. Two years later, the court implemented a
provisional financing scheme, which was designed to allow the legislature additional time to approve a constitutionally permissible system of school financing. See
Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 133, 155, 351 A.2d 713, 724, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 913
(1975). The New Jersey Legislature responded by passing the Public School Education Act of 1975, ch. 212, 1975 N.J. Laws 871, and in 1976, the state supreme
court upheld this Act. See Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 449, 467, 355 A.2d 129, 139
(1976). Subsequently, the court enjoined any expenditures for public education
until the legislature provided full funding for the scheme established by the 1975
Act. Robinson v. Cahill, 70 N.J. 155, 160-61, 358 A.2d 457, 459, injunction dissolved,
70 N.J. 465, 360 A.2d 400 (1976).
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courts in the wake of such decisions is neither new, unexpected,
nor necessarily undesirable.
How should a court contend with adverse public commentary? What, if anything, should a court do when confronted and
challenged by such criticism? There are some who hold the view
that judicial independence and integrity foreclose any rejoinder
to critical attacks upon courts. A higher responsibility of the
courts, it is believed, mandates a calculated stoicism in the face of
critics.
There is something to be said for the avoidance of spirited
rejoinder to public rebuke. One might agree that courts should
not engage in any open defense of their decisions. To do so
could entail abandoning or compromising that which is unique
and essential to thejudiciary-its ability to be truly independent,
objective, and impartial, and to remain above public, partisan, or
political fray.
Even so, I do not think that judicial independence demands
studied passivity or stubborn indifference to the public reaction
to court decisions. Indeed, as a constituent and vital part of representative democratic government, the judiciary must be highly
attuned to the needs and feelings of its citizens; it should be
acutely aware of the public's perception of its general performance, as well as its particular decisions. In short, the judiciary
cannot be oblivious to the reactions that its own actions have engendered or the effects that its adjudications have created within
the society it serves.
Judicial responsiveness to the public is proper because the
judiciary, notwithstanding its need to be objective and impartial,
must still perform a cooperative and constructive function as a
pivotal, governmental role player in representative democracy.
Yet, while to some degree courts must understand and accommodate public expectations, they do not have the same structured
outlets to develop and gain public support as the other two
popularly elected branches of government. Courts cannot secure
a popular mandate. It is therefore especially necessary for the
judiciary to be concerned with its own legitimacy and to assure
and project that legitimacy within a proper framework.
This discussion, then, concerns the special kind of legitimacy
that a court may seek and achieve. It deals with "judicial legitimacy," and with judicial responsibility and accountability, which
are the twin pillars of that legitimacy. In dealing with these
themes, an appropriate point of departure is the judicial deci-
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sional process. It is primarily through this process that courts
discharge their constitutional responsibility, perform their allotted governmental role, and have their greatest effect upon society. The discussion will focus upon the nature of the decisional
process and explore, with the benefit of scholarly insight,
whether that process can be elucidated in a manner so that courts
can better understand their own work and so that, in turn, the
work of the courts can be better understood. This may bring us
to a clearer perception of judicial responsibility and
accountability.
It seems to me that a reasoned, sound, and coherent conception of the nature of law is at the heart of any analysis purporting
to address these concerns. An overview of jurisprudence, particularly contemporary conceptualizations as to the essential nature
of law, can be instructive. To this end, I propose to survey some
aspects of jurisprudence, albeit with pardonable oversimplification consistent with my own limitations and the constraints of
time.
I believe some common elements can be culled from an exposition of current legal philosophy. These elements can serve
as both a guide for and a measure of the adequacy of judicial
adjudication. The decisional process should, therefore, reflect
the application of these implied principles. It should be possible
to see how, and with what success, the application of these principles is effectuated in the decisions of particular cases.
This discussion of jurisprudential conceptualizations, implications, and applications should suggest some interesting ramifications that relate to the decisional process as such and to our
threshold-and ultimate-concerns of judicial responsibility, accountability, and legitimacy. In a sense, we will have come full
circle. In the course of this journey, I hope we will have seen
whether it is possible to recognize and heed public criticism of
judicial performance, to assess the reasonableness of such criticism in terms of the adequacy ofjudicial decision making, and to
defend credibly-through explanation-the role of the judiciary
without compromising judicial independence or integrity.
II.

CONCEPTUALIZATIONS

First, let me sketch some of the major schools of contemporary jurisprudence. I accept the notion that the legal system is a
human institution designed to accomplish human purposes. As
such, we can believe that law is a human inspiration and creation,
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and that law in a broad sense reflects both the kind of society in
which we wish to live and the goals we wish to achieve. Nevertheless, throughout civilized history, law has often been perceived as
reflecting not only social authority, but also an ultimate truth or
morality. From this perspective, law has been considered to be
divine or as emanating from immutable and universal principles
of nature.
Conceived as divine or natural, law embraced not simply society's power, but also its moral values. This view of law was perhaps most forcefully expounded by the English jurist Lord
Blackstone, who taught that the English common law was both
the natural law and the law of God, incidentally giving judges a
rather cardinal role in the scheme of things.
Over time, others articulated the view that some of our most
important moral values either do not lend themselves to achievement directly through laws or judicial decisions or, for other reasons, should be considered outside the prerogative of law. Such
a philosophy, denominated legal positivism, reflects the influence
of the English legal theoristJeremy Bentham. Bentham, who had
attended Blackstone's lectures at Oxford, was dismayed by the
notion that the common law was the "natural" law or God's law.
From Bentham's intellectual rebellion arose the legal positivist
philosophy that survives with vigor in English and American law
schools today.
The legal positivist theory is characterized by the separation
of legal and moral principles. It is derived from the premises that
law is positive and must arise from the will of the majority; that
law has no inherent moral or ethical content; that moral questions are irreducibly subjective; and that the judge's function is to
discern what the law is, not what it ought to be.6 This philosophy
6 It is important to note that the positivist theory, which separates legal and
moral obligations, is not devoid of moral content. It merely employs a different
kind of principle or obligation to reach the results it sees as correct. Bentham was a
moral philosopher himself, and subsequent legal positivists were heavily influenced
by the utilitarian philosophy of John Stuart Mill, an intellectual disciple of Bentham.
According to the legal positivists, the critical moral assessment of our legal
institutions should be done according to utilitarian, not natural law, principles.
Thus, under one aspect of utilitarianism-act utilitarianism-a person's action is
morally right if it brings about good consequences. Another form of utilitarianism-rule utilitarianism-would regard an action as morally right if it is the kind
that would have good consequences if everyone did it. Thus, moral rules are implicated in legal positivism because they are conceived as being based on a precept
that does not itself specify an end or purpose, the furtherance of which makes acts
right.
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has been expressed in many forms throughout history.7
There are those who have reacted to legal positivism with
extraordinary singularity. Their jurisprudence effectively
reduces law to essentially one dimension. For example, Karl
Llewellyn contended at one time that it was illusory to believe
that rules decided cases." Jerome Frank believed that law is simply the decision in a particular case. 9 This view, which perceives
judges as policy makers, came to be described as legal realism, an
indigenously American philosophy.' 0
The foremost proponent of contemporary legal positivism is
H.L.A. Hart. His basic thesis is that law reflects social authority."1 Law is encapsulated in clear legal rules, which are understood, identified, and validated by a "master rule"-the "rule of
recognition"-reflecting a common understanding or general
consensus. Decisions not based upon rules, according to Hart,
are not truly law, but instead constitute the exercise of judicial
discretion and are essentially legislative in character. Hart characterizes the areas in which judicial discretion has to be invoked
as "zones or areas of creativity" involving unprecedented cases
that are governed not by available rules, but by extralegal factors
such as social purposes, public policies, and occasionally, moral
considerations.
Hart's understanding of the role of moral rules also reflects
the Benthamite roots of contemporary legal positivism. Moral
rules, according to Hart, are content neutral. While moral rules
differ from rules of law, they are properly called "rules" only be7 See, e.g., D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW 7-36 (1977) (summarizing natural law and origins of legal positivism). The subject of legal positivism
receives extensive attention in this article. This discussion is derived for the most
part from the cited sources and the several books and articles that are referred to
and cited hereafter.
8 See K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 3-41
(1962).
9 SeeJ. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 50-51 (Anchor Books ed. 1963).
I0 See generally Bodenheimer, Hart, Dworkin, and the Problem of JudicialLawmaking
Discretion, 11 GA. L. REV. 1143, 1149-51 (1977) (contrasting legal realism with ruleoriented decision making); Richards, Rules, Policies, and Neutral Principles: The Search
for Legitimacy in Common Law and ConstitutionalAdjudication, 11 GA. L. REV. 1069,
1076-78 (1977) (outlining the common law reasoning process).
I I One of the primary works expounding the essential elements of Hart's philosophy is H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). Other instructive sources are
Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream,
11 GA. L. REV. 969 (1977), and Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,
71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958). His legal theories have also been described and analyzed by most of the authors whose works are referred to in the text and footnotes
of this article.
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cause of the following reasons: (1) they have great importance;
(2) they are immune from deliberate change; (3) they call for voluntary compliance and excuse noncompliance; and (4) they preserve compliance through conscience, not punishment.
There are others who do not hold with the dichotomous
view of the legal positivists or the one-dimensional view of the
realists. The leading contemporary exponent of a differing view
is Professor Ronald Dworkin, who succeeded to Hart's chair at
Oxford.' 2 Law, for Dworkin, is that which is determined not only
by clear and uncontradicted rules, but also by precepts that are
firmly recognized though not totally clear, fixed, or uncontradicted. These he calls principles. Thus, law, according to Dworkin, is and may be predicated on principles as well as upon rules.
The primary difference between a principle and a rule is that a
principle can be controversial. In effect, principles are inchoate
or embryonic rules. What is necessary to convert a principle into
a rule is for a judge to crystallize the principle into a clear basis
for decision. This process arises in the context of the "hard
case"-a case that is not governed by an existing rule or
precedent.

3

Judicial discretion, in Dworkin's view, is implicated in deciding a case according to principles. This decisional task is difficult
and discretionary because it entails choosing among competing
principles, and assigning weight and importance to principles in
the process of finding the correct grounds for decision. A principle thus used as a ground for decision can create a legal obligation, just as a rule does. Because legal obligations arise from the
application of principles, courts must apply principles with consistency, that is, with reference to existing rules and established
precepts. On the basis of such consistency, a case decided according to principle will have had its roots in the extant body of
law. From this perspective, such a decision does not radically alter reasonable expectations; the decision comes as no real sur4
prise and is therefore entitled to be applied retroactively.'
Thus, all decisional law must have this nexus with existing legal
It Professor Dworkin is one of the most heavily discussed contemporary legal
philosophers. The following works of Dworkin are particularly relevant to this discussion: R. DWORKIN, rAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) and R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985) [hereinafter cited as R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF
IRINCIPLE]. See also Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Dworkin, Iard Cases].
I See Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 12, at 1060.
14 See id. at 1061-62.
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sources, demonstrating
consistency." 15

what

Dworkin

calls

"articulate

Dworkin also takes great care in drawing and explaining the
distinction between policy and principle.' 6 According to Dworkin, a decision based on principle rather than policy addresses
the legal rights and relationships of the parties; it secures an individual or group right. In contrast, a policy decision is one that
seeks to advance or protect a collective goal of the community as
a whole.' 7 Consequently, policy determinations entail the selection among available means to serve collective ends. "Policy" is
concerned with achieving societal or collective ends, not individual rights. In addition, law that is based on policy, unlike law
based on rules and principles, need not have any articulate, internal consistency, nor even any reasoned basis for assigning more
weight or importance to one policy consideration than to another. For these reasons, policy decisions are most appropriately
left to the legislature; courts, in Dworkin's view, should eschew
being a "deputy-legislature" and avoid determining questions of
policy.
In this setting, Dworkin also holds to a dichotomous view of
the law. Some commentators have referred to Dworkin as a
"closet positivist" because he believes that law is based only on
rules and principles and because he acknowledges that certain
principles can be legally valid. These scholars maintain that any
test that establishes the validity of principles is really a disguise
for Hart's "rule of recognition."' 8 Dworkin's conceptualization
of law may be contrasted with that which might be referred to as
the "holistic" view of law, a philosophy that law does not end
abruptly at a boundary embracing only rules, or only rules together with principles, but instead goes beyond, covering policy
and moral considerations as well. Decisions that are based upon
any or all of these grounds truly constitute law.
Professor Lon Fuller was one of the most prominent contemporary philosophers to express the view that law embraces
moral values. 9 According to Fuller, law is not content neutral,
15 Id. at 1064.

16 See id. at 1058-70.
17 Id. at 1059, 1067.
I8 See, e.g., Raz, Legal Principlesand the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823 (1972) (analyzing and criticizing Dworkin's theories); see also J. RAZ, THE CONCERT OF A LEGAL
SYSTEM 197-200 (1970) (commenting on Hart's "rule of recognition").
11)Professor Fuller's views have been the subject of extensive commentary. References to Fuller have been drawn primarily from L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW
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but is "purposive." A legal system must contain certain moral
properties-such as generality, publication, prospectivity, intelligibility, consistency, adjustment to human capacity, stability, and
congruity. With such properties, the legal system can provide
public rules that serve as a basis for legitimate expectations upon
which people can orient their behavior. Law is an enterprise, a
dynamic process that attempts to subject human conduct to the
governance of rules and, as such, is inherently value laden.
Fuller theorized that law must of necessity consider what ought
to be. He concluded that law derives its ultimate support from
the sense of being "right." It is characterized by an "internal
consistency," involving moral rules that reflect what is intrinsically "right." As a dynamic process, however, law is not always
successful. That is because law is not simply a manifested fact of
social authority, something to be studied only for what it is and
does; rather, it should also be analyzed for what it is trying to do
and become. Thus, to Fuller, law is a complex of what is and
what ought to be.
There are many other contemporary theorists who have expressed in differing ways, sometimes through their own exegesis
and sometimes through the constructive criticism of others, this
more expansive, holistic conceptualization of the law. Their
views with respect to the decisional process are highly instructive.20 For example, Kent Greenawalt of the Columbia School of
Law accepts Dworkin's thesis that judges must rely on principles
in deciding certain cases and accepts the distinction between
principles and policy. He does not, however, subscribe to Dworkin's notion of judicial discretion, which always leads to the presumed, correct result. Discretion, Greenawalt observes, could be
(rev. ed. 1969). See also Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV.
353 (1978); Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to ProfessorHart, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 630 (1958).
20 In addition to the scholars mentioned in the text, holistic or moralistic conceptualizations of law have been expressed in a variety of forms by other commentators. For example, William T. Blackstone expressed the concept of a "morality of
natural necessity," which is the basis for primary rules of obligation in law. There
are, in his view, "moral facts" inherent in human existence and survival, which have
a proper place in the rendition of law. See Blackstone, The Relationship of Law and
Morality, 11 GA. L. REV. 1359, 1371 (1977). David A.J. Richards espoused "methodological natural law theory," emphasizing the absence of any clear demarcation
between principles and policy-the "rich middle ground" that comprises much of
law. D. RICHARDS, supra note 7, at 31-34. This theory arises from the "essentially
empirical observation that legal and moral concepts significantly interconnect in
concrete legal institutions of many kinds." Id. at 33. It is a view that Dworkin seemingly tolerates. See, e.g., Dworkin, Seven Critics, 11 GA. L. REV. 1201, 1250-58 (1977).
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said to exist "so long as no practical procedure exists for determining if a result is correct, [so long as] informed lawyers disagree about the proper result, and [so long as] a judge's decision
either way will not widely be considered a failure to perform his
judicial responsibilities. '21 Thus, when legal sources leave an issue genuinely in doubt, judges properly rely on firm convictions
of moral rightness and social welfare that command wide support. Greenawalt feels that it is necessary for courts to "lend a
hand," particularly in the area of statutory interpretation. 2
Edgar Bodenheimer disagrees with Dworkin that rules are
all-or-nothing. He agrees, however, that principles are a part of
the law, but he would go further. He acknowledges that informal
sources of law, such as common conviction, principles of public
policy, and moral considerations, are also part of the legal order.25 Successful judicial effort involves the linkage of innovation
to a set of accepted opinions, traditions, or preferred societal values. A new right is determined, according to Bodenheimer,
when arguments in its favor are of "decisive superiority," even
though the right is controversial. There can be a judicial transmutation of a moral canon into a legal duty when a mode of behavior is conceived "to be a well-nigh indispensable, rather than
a merely desirable ' 24 aspect of human conduct. Thus, according
to Bodenheimer, there may be moral and social principles that
lend themselves to incorporation into the legal order.
Similar to these views is one that embraces the open-ended
concept of law. Stephen Munzer, who teaches at UCLA, recognizes Dworkin's philosophy and its important precept of articulate consistency, but points out that it does not preclude
numerous cases in which the right answer will be lacking. 25 He
draws a provocative analogy to literature-the standard of "narrative consistency"-and uses Maggie Verver in James's The
Golden Bowl and Joyce's Finnegan's Wake among his examples-I
would add a contemporary work such as Fowles's The French Lieu21 Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters That
Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 359, 386 (1975).
22 See generally Greenawalt, Policy, Rights, and Judicial Decision, 11 GA. L. REv. 991
(1977); Greenawalt, supra note 21.
2"3 See Bodenheimer, supra note 10.
24 Id. at 1169.
25 Munzer, Right Answers, Preexisting Rights, and Fairness, 11 GA. L. REV. 1055,
1057-59 (1977). The elusiveness of consistency in adjudication is discussed in
Book Note, Dancing in the Dark: The Philosophical Moves of Ronald Dworkin, 23 HARV. J.
ON LEGIs. 307 (1986).
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tenant's Woman 26 -to point out that an author may construct 2a7
work so that an issue is left purposely in an ambiguous state.
Thus, according to Munzer, in an advanced legal system, principles of decision may not "yield uniquely correct results."' 28 Even
Dworkin has come to recognize a class of hard cases-perhaps to
be called the "hardest cases"-that will not have uniquely correct
results. Munzer states that just as authors may write novels that
intentionally leave some questions insusceptible of definite resolution, so may judges-and of course legislators-leave the exact
bearing of a legal determination open with respect to certain issues. The purpose of such "conscious indeterminacy" is often to
defer the resolution of the most difficult issues until those issues
can be more precisely formulated and the consequences better
29
ascertained.
Another exponent of this open-ended view of law is Joseph
Singer of the Boston University Law School, who expresses the
notion that law necessarily and properly should be applied on an
ad hoc basis. He particularly stresses the inevitability of contradictions, which arise whenever a judge must determine the applicable legal rule.3 0 He acknowledges that there is no real
objectivity to the resolution of contradictions in particular cases;
rather, what is done, echoing the thought of Oliver Wendell
Holmes, is to preserve "the illusion of certainty." ' 3' In effect, according to Singer, courts can make rational choices, but not by a
very refined logic. Singer accepts as a consequence of his thesis
that the legitimacy of judicial power is seemingly undermined by
the realization that decisions are, in this sense, "politically" motivated. Because even legal decisions must grapple with fundamental contradictions, courts have no alternative but to decide
cases in light of competing goals and interests on a case-by-case
basis. The antidote to this is the conscientious weighing of com26 In rewriting this article subsequent to the delivery of the lecture, I consulted
R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 12. I discovered that in develop-

ing the analogy between law and literature, Dworkin was similarly struck by the
purposeful ambiguity of Fowles's novel, which he treats extensively in chapter six,
How Law is Like Literature. See id. at 154-58.
27 See Munzer, supra note 25, at 1057.
28 Id.
29) Id. at 1059.
3) See Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to
lIohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 975, 1058-59 [hereinafter cited as Singer, Legal Rights];
see also Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1
(1984).
3 1 Singer, Legal Rights, supra note 30, at 1058 (quoting Holmes, Privilege, Malice,
md Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1894)).

1986]

PRUDENTIAL JUSTICE

peting considerations and persuasive explanations of the reasoning process and the result reached. 2
III.

IMPLICATIONS

Regardless of the philosophy preferred or chosen, this overview implies that standards of general applicability to the decisional process can be identified and extrapolated from
jurisprudence. These standards can serve not only as guidelines
for, but also as a rudimentary measure of, the adequacy of judicial performance.
An important implication to be derived from jurisprudence
is that law has an inner core. While the scholars seemingly differ
on the issue of the outer boundaries of law, they appear to agree
that law has a tangible center. Law always encompasses, at a minimum, clear and accepted rules. While, according to some, this
central core is the law, it is in reality the primary basis upon which
law-indeed most of our decisional law-is based.
There are special cases whose resolution can move or extend
the law from its core foundations. These cases stretch current or
accepted law beyond its traditional, recognized bounds, regardless of how fixed those boundaries are drawn. Bodenheimer regarded these as unprovided-for cases, whose determination
occurs in an extralegal corona, a transitional or penumbral zone
of law, in which the decisional determinants move farther and
farther away from the gravitational pull of the core-center of the
law itself. 3 Thus, there is general acknowledgment that the decisional process can involve in a given case not only the determination of law as it exists without dispute, but also the extension of
law, which may or may not be properly considered a genuine part
of the law, depending on the underlying conceptualization of the
nature of law.
A primary implication distilled from this perception of lawmaking is the existence of the "hard case." Hart, who so strongly
stressed that fixed rules comprise real law, also dealt extensively
with the difficult case that cannot be readily resolved by such
rules, arguably implying that law has an elastic quality. Dworkin,
who is most identified with the concept of the "hard case," considered such cases as those in which a judge would be called
upon to select principles as a ground of decision in the absence
32 See id. at 1059.

:"' See Bodenheimer, supra note 10, at 1 150, I 171-72.
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of a determinative rule. Once decided, however, such a decision
itself would then take its place in the family of law. Furthermore,
Dworkin also recognized the potential for the judicial determination of a "hard case" to be premised upon policy rather than a
reasoned extension of principle. There could be an exception
for cases of "special urgency." Munzer observed that numerous
cases did not yield uniquely correct or "right answers." Singer
stressed the intractable, inevitable, and recurrent contradictions
inherent in the legal system, which demand resolution on an ad
hoc basis, implying that most cases are really "hard cases." Justice Cardozo, in The Nature of the Judicial Process, while not resorting to the vocabulary we are presently employing, himself aptly
described a judge's confrontation with the "hard case":
What is it that I do when I decide a case? To what sources of
information do I appeal for guidance? In what proportions do
I permit them to contribute to the result? In what proportions
ought they to contribute? If a precedent is applicable, when
do I refuse to follow it? If no precedent is applicable, how do I
reach the rule that will make a precedent for the future? If I
am seeking logical consistency, the symmetry of the legal
structure, how far shall I seek it? At what point shall the quest
be halted by some discrepant custom, by some consideration
of the social welfare, by my own or the common standards of
justice and morals? 4
The "hard case" is the crucible in which law is created; it propels the law toward new horizons. For these reasons, the "hard
case" can serve as a launching pad, in effect, for an analysis of the
decisional process. An instructive example is Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc.,5 a case extensively discussed by Dworkin.
In Henningsen, the NewJersey Supreme Court concluded that an
automobile manufacturer should be held to a higher standard than
other manufacturers and should not be insulated from liability by
the narrow warranty limitation in the contract of sale when the automobile proved defective.3 6 In reaching this unprecedented result,
the court identified competing principles and then assigned comparative weight and importance to each in order to determine whether
the "weight of the individual right" asserted by the plaintiffs overcame the countervailing principles, or rights, offered by the defendant.3 7 Thus, the court observed that "we must keep in mind the
34
3.5

36
37

B.

CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 10

32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
See id. at 404-05, 161 A.2d at 95.
See id. at 403-04, 161 A.2d at 94-95.

(1921).
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general principle that, in the absence of fraud, one who does not
choose to read a contract before signing it, cannot later relieve himself of its burdens." '3 8 It also factored into its analysis the related
principle of "freedom of competent parties to contract," as well as
the absence of real bargaining power on the plaintiff's part.39
The court then acknowledged the need to weigh competing
principles, observing that "[f]reedom of contract is not such an immutable doctrine as to admit of no qualification in the area in which
we are concerned." ' 40 The competing principles and policy considerations that the court marshaled were these:
In a society such as ours, where the automobile is a common
and necessary adjunct of daily life, and where its use is so
fraught with danger to the driver, passengers and the public,
the manufacturer is under a special obligation in connection
with the construction, promotion and sale of his cars, [an obligation to treat] consumer and public interests . . .fairly. 4 ,

The court then asked rhetorically, " '[I]s there any principle which is
more familiar or more firmly embedded in the history of AngloAmerican law than the basic doctrine that the courts will not permit
themselves to be used as instruments of inequity and injustice?' "42
It concluded, in selecting a determinative principle, that the courts
will " 'refuse to lend themselves to the enforcement of a 'bargain' in
which one party has unjustly taken advantage of the economic necessities of the other.' -"

What Henningsen illustrates so well is the existence of a firm bedrock to which law is anchored. The "hard case" is the one that exposes what underlies the surface and frees the law from its
foundational moorings. In addition to the themes of the core-center
of law and the outreaches of law that are exemplified by such a hard
case, however, jurisprudence invariably points up the distinctive
role of morality in influencing law.
There are unique conceptual difficulties in the law's accommodation of morality. This is so whether morality is considered an intrinsic part of the law or an extralegal influence. The implications of
the role and impact of morality in the effectuation of law and the
38

Id. at 386, 161 A.2d at 84.

39

Id.

40

Id. at 388, 161 A.2d at 86.

41

Id. at 387, 161 A.2d at 85.

42

Id. at 389, 161 A.2d at 86 (quoting United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,

315 U.S. 289, 326 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
43 Id. (quoting United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 326 (1942)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
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decisional process are not of passing academic interest only. The
assumptions concerning the proper place of morality in the development of law can measurably determine not only the decisional
route taken by a court in a given case, but also the degree to which
others, including society, can accept the court's decision as properly
founded.
A favorite example of the interaction between morality and law
involves the question of whether one has a legal or moral duty to
rescue another in distress, a question frequently posed over time.
In general, there is an almost complete absence of a legal duty to
rescue a person in fatal danger. In 1908, James B. Ames wrote that
one who can attempt a rescue with little or no inconvenience to himself should have a legal duty to do so; he recognized the practical
difficulty in line drawing, but observed that the problem it presents
is continual rather than insurmountable.4 4
Dworkin hypothesizes a situation in which one person is drowning and another may rescue the person at peril while incurring only
a negligible risk.4 5 The ultimate issue is whether the rescuer owes a
duty to save the drowning man. Dworkin sees this question as turning upon whether the "collective utility" of both men is improved by
the rescue, thereby extending to the drowning man a right to the
rescue and to the potential rescuer a duty to act.4 6 His ultimate view
rests solely on a consideration of "the welfare of those whose abstract rights are at stake." 4 7 In this context, Dworkin specifically
cautions against reliance upon policy. He argues that if the principle requiring rescue at minimal risk is modified to consider the marginal utility to the entire community rather than only the collective
or respective utilities of the victim and the rescuer, the results will
be both inconsistent and unpersuasive. In such a case, the rescuer
would be required to consider the risk to himself, the risk to the
victim, and the relative social importance of each individual. What
might logically follow is that an "insignificant" man might be required to save a "rich" man, but not vice versa. This result, according to Dworkin, compels the rejection of policy as a foundation for
48
deciding the "hard case."

In 1959, this legal and moral conundrum was presented to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the case of Yania v. Bigan.4" In that
44
45

Ames, Law and iorals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 112-13 (1908).
See Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 12, at 1076.

46 Id.
47
48

49

Id.
Id. at 1077.
397 Pa. 316, 155 A.2d 343 (1959).
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case, the defendant taunted the victim to jump into a water-filled
ditch located on the defendant's property. The victim then
drowned while the defendant stood by. " °' The court held the defendant not liable, stating that "[t]he mere fact that Bigan saw Yania
in a position of peril in the water imposed upon him no legal,
although [there was] a moral, obligation or duty to go to his rescue
unless Bigan was legally responsible . . . for placing Yania in the
perilous position."'" Thus, the court refused to include its own idea
of morality as a part of the decisional law of the state.
Jurisprudence can also determine or color perceptions of the
appropriate intergovernmental roles and functions in the legal process. A particular conceptualization of law impliedly assigns and allocates responsibility for making law. According to one view of the
nature of law, the determination of a given issue or controversy may
be one that can appropriately be made only by judges, or alternatively, only by legislators, or indeed, may best be left to society and
the collective conscience of the community. Nevertheless, a particular controversy may present issues that tangle a variety of decisional
strands-rules of law, general principles, precepts of policy, and
moral values-so that an ultimate and enduring resolution may actually require the participation of not only the judiciary, but also the
legislature. Indeed, such a resolution may call for public involvement and social understanding of the issue as well. Jurisprudential
assumptions may have a lot to do with the acceptability of the way
law is effectuated in a given matter.
Thus, considerations of jurisprudence can yield a number of
important implications that are relevant to the judicial decisional
process. The first is that accepted, clear legal rules undergird most
of our decisional law. Another, the obverse, is suggested by the
existence of the controversy that cannot be resolved by established
law or precedent. Such cases escalate the decisional role to a level
that is complex, dynamic, and innovative, rather than straightforward, static, or mechanical. A further consequence is that the identification or characterization of a case as one invoking this heightened
judicial performance itself becomes a significant judicial function.
An additional implication is the importance of comprehending
the available bases that may be relevant and applicable in deciding
such hard cases. In dealing with the hard case, the court must engage in a wide-angle survey of the decisional topography; a court
must orient itself to a sense of whether it is on the solid bedrock of
50

Id. at 318, 155 A.2d at 344-45.

51 Id. at 321-22, 155 A.2d at 346.
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precedent, the loose footings of principle, or the uneven terrain of
policy or morality. The court must then rationally choose the particular bottom in which to plant its decision. In this exercise, the
court must proceed rationally in quantifying, comparing, and weighing the various decisional grounds that are available, and its ultimate selection of a decisional foundation must follow soundly from
a rational methodology. Because a court's decision in a hard case is
bound to be disputable, the court should also recognize the need to
reveal and explain fully all of the facets of the decisional process:
the initial analysis of the controversy, the threshold categorization
of the case as hard or unprecedented, the identification and examination of all grounds that bear upon the decision, the selection
among competing grounds, and the reasons by which particular
grounds are quantified, assigned priority, and ultimately given determinative weight.
Finally, it is important to recognize when the court has based its
determination upon policy considerations or moral values. Decisions resting on these grounds usually transcend the interests of the
parties themselves. They uniquely implicate the interests of society
in general, as much as they determine the rights of the individuals
or groups who are litigants in the particular case. In cases affecting
collective or community interests, the court must be prepared to acknowledge its own finite decisional authority and powers. It must,
in such cases, take into account the paramount subject-matter concerns and the superior issue-resolving resources and ability of other
branches or agencies of government, and of those institutions and
segments of society whose assigned or accepted role is to address
and decide just such questions. In those cases, the court must be
attuned to recognize, even as it renders a decision, when appropriate and responsible actions concerning the judicially decided issues
are or may be taken by others. When courts confront novel and
significant public questions, eventual judicial response and reaction
can be as important as threshold judicial initiative and imagination.
IV.

APPLICATIONS

Within the analytical framework we have structured, it
should be, possible to see whether a court has properly and
soundly engaged in the decisional process. This thesis can be
illustrated by representative decisions relating to major areas
of public concern, such as those involving individuality, those
dealing with interpersonal relationships, and those addressing
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group relationships, including governmental or institutional
relationships.
With recurring frequency, courts have been called upon to
decide cases that directly touch the integrity of the individual.
Three such cases are In re Quinlan5 2 in 1976, In re Grady " in 1981,
and In re Conroy5 4 in 1985. In each, the court was faced with
profound and vexatious issues concerning incompetent persons
unable to make choices for themselves on matters affecting their
very survival, basic well-being, and personal privacy: Quinlan involved a twenty-two-year-old, permanently comatose woman,
whose father sought to have her removed from a life-prolonging
respirator; 55 Grady involved a nineteen-year-old, mentally retarded woman whose parents wished to have her sterilized;5 6 and
Conroy concerned the request of a guardian to have a feeding device removed from an eighty-four-year-old, seriously and perma57
nently impaired woman whose death was imminent.
The controversy giving rise to Conroy unquestionably
presented a "hard case," one not governed by available decisional precedent or any statutory ground of decision or regulatory rule of law. The court proceeded to examine a number of
relevant principles as possible grounds for reaching its determination. The court referred to Ms. Conroy's right of privacy. It
found this principle to be inapposite as a determinative ground
of decision, however, and ultimately turned to tort principles for
guidance. Specifically, the court based its analysis on the doctrine or principle of "informed consent"-"a primary means developed in the law to protect this personal interest in the
integrity of one's body. ' 58 From the tort doctrine of informed
consent, the court reasoned that "[t]he patient's ability to control
his bodily integrity through informed consent is significant only
when one recognizes that this right also encompasses a right to
informed refusal."" Together, the right of consent and the right
of refusal comprised the common law right to self-determination.
The court then determined that countervailing principles relating to state interests in preserving life, preventing suicide, safe52 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
53 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981).

54 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
55 Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 18, 355 A.2d at 651.
56 Grady, 85 N.J. at 240-42, 426 A.2d at 469-70.
57 Conroy, 98 N.J. at 337-39, 486 A.2d at 1216-17.
58 Id. at 346, 486 A.2d at 1222.

59 Id. at 347, 486 A.2d at 1222.
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guarding the integrity of the medical profession, and protecting
innocent third parties failed to outweigh the right to selfdetermination."'
The more troublesome issue in Conroy arose from the need
to protect and vindicate this right in view of the individual's inability to exercise it. In resolving this dilemma, the court built on
its foundational right to self-determination. Analogizing to testamentary dispositions of property, the court reasoned that a person's inability to express herself does not result in the loss of that
person's entitlement to those rights. 6 ' Accordingly, in line with
its self-determination premise, it ruled that "life-sustaining treatment may be withheld or withdrawn from an incompetent patient
when it is clear that the particular patient would have refused the
treatment under the circumstances involved."6 2 With respect to
the majority of the people, however, who have not previously revealed their views on life-sustaining treatment, the court recognized the shortcomings of the self-determination premise,
observing that "in the absence of adequate proof of the patient's
wishes, it is naive to pretend that the right to self-determination
serves as the basis for substituted decision-making. ' 63 The court
therefore turned to a traditional legal principle, the parens patriae power, which supports the State's authority to permit decisions to be made for an incompetent that serve the incompetent's
best interests. It then fashioned objective or demonstrable tests
to effectuate the best interests of the patient in determining
whether life-sustaining treatment should be ended.6 4
Although the court properly attempted to ground its decision firmly on the basis of principles that were carefully compared, quantified, and balanced, it is noteworthy that it could not
avoid treading upon the infirm footings of moral values, a consequence, I submit, that is inherent in the best-interest standard. A
decision based on an individual's best interests reflects "a collection of values that society will impute to incompetent persons
who cannot express their own preferences. '65 The case in this
respect exemplifies the ways in which even the most scrupulously
considered and conservatively drawn decisions-those based as
60 See id. at 348-53, 486 A.2d at 1223-25.

61 Id. at 359, 486 A.2d at 1229.
62 Id. at 360, 486 A.2d at 1229.
63 Id. at 364, 486 A.2d at 1231.
64 See id. at 364-67, 486 A.2d at 1231-33.
65 Id. at 392, 486 A.2d at 1246 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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much as possible on recognized "legal" precedent and carefully
weighed principles-will frequently draw upon public policy and
morality.
The application of these precepts to another major area of
public concern-interpersonal relationships-is exemplified by
the case of Kelly v. Gwinnell.6 The Kelly court was challenged to
consider the relationship between a social host, his guest, and
unknown third persons, and whether that relationship entailed a
responsibility and an enforceable legal duty on the part of the
host to avoid the risk that his drunken guest would cause an automobile accident. The challenge was posed by a young woman
who was seriously injured when her automobile was struck headon by a car driven by the guest after he had become extremely
intoxicated at the home of the host.6 7 This case was regarded as
a "hard case" in that no case law or statute had considered imposing a legal duty on the host under these particular circumstances. While precedent existed imposing liability upon one
engaged in the tavern business for the conduct of an inebriated
adult patron who subsequently caused injury and upon social
hosts serving liquor to an intoxicated minor, our courts had recognized neither the extension nor the limitation of liability to a
social host for serving liquor to a visibly intoxicated adult.6" The
issue was genuinely unresolved and not governed by any firm
precedent.
Initially, the court recognized that this case involved the
traditional precepts of negligence. Thus, it simply considered
whether under traditional tort principles a duty exists or should
be imposed upon the social host to prevent the unreasonable risk
of harm presented by a drunken driver. In ascertaining whether
a duty should rightfully be imposed upon a social host under the
facts, the court specifically noted that perceptions of fairness
should dictate the result, which called for the "weighing of the
relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk, and the public
interest in the proposed solution." 6 9 In addition, the court considered matters of public policy. It emphasized the drunken driving problem in society, citing numerous sanctions as evidence of
the community's policy and moral judgments. It found these to
66 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
67 Id. at 541, 476 A.2d at 1220.
68 See generally Note, Social Host Held Liablefor Serving Liquor to Intoxicated Guest llWho
Causes Auto Accident Injuring Third Party, 15 SETON HALL L. REv. 616, 619-24 (1985)
(outlining prior New Jersey law).
9 Kelly, 96 N.J. at 544, 476 A.2d at 1222.
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outweigh community mores associated with social drinking in the
home and concluded that the curtailment of these mores was significantly outweighed by a rule of conduct70 that would reduce the
harm that can result from such drinking.
The opinion is also instructive because the court expressly
made its holding prospective only. This determination impliedly
recognized that controversial policy considerations, in contrast to
clear legal rules or common principles, constituted the major
ground of decision. In this sense, the opinion departs from the
notion of "articulate consistency." Because such a decision
moves into the realm of the unexpected, fairness and acceptability require that it not be applied retroactively. 7 ' The opinion is
controversial-aside from one's view of its correctness-because
it implicates considerations of public policy and also draws upon
the perceived moral judgment of the community, which roundly
condemns the evils of drunken driving. It thus falls within the
legislative domain, albeit not exclusively.
In addition, the case is noteworthy in terms of what it did not
decide. The decision left unresolved issues such as the legal status of persons in different social settings from that involved in
the Kelly case itself. The opinion thus illustrates Singer's ad hoc
approach and Munzer's notion of "conscious indeterminacy" in
the development of the decisional law.
Finally, there is the case of Department of Environmental Protection v. Ventron Corp. ,7 which focused on group and governmental
relationships. In Ventron, the court addressed the responsibility
of various corporate entities for the cost of cleanup and removal
of mercury that had been dumped onto a forty-acre tract of land
and allowed7 to seep into Berry's Creek, an estuary of the Hackensack River. ' The case primarily involved the interpretation of
statutory provisions governing pollution liability. The statute
purported to impose liability upon any person who was responsiSee id. at 548, 476 A.2d at 1224.
This further illustrates why a "hard case" may be on the cutting edge of judicial adjudication:
Because the principles invoked in judicial decision of hard cases are implicit in extant precedents, there is no actionable unfairness in a court's
insistence that such principles in fact existed prior to the particular decision actually applying them. In contrast, legislative decisions, typically
resting on policies, are correctly given only prospective effect.
Richards, supra note 10, at 1081 (footnote omitted).
72 94 N.J. 473, 468 A.2d 150 (1983).
73 Id. at 481, 468 A.2d at 154.
70
71
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ble for causing a toxic-waste injury to the land."4
In its decision, the court drew upon existing precedent and
major relevant principles. Because of the imprecision of the statutory phraseology and the uncertain status of legislative intent,
the court felt impelled to review cases dealing with landowner
responsibility and common law nuisance principles. Accordingly,
it clarified an existing body of decisional law. It elected to adopt
the principle of an early common law case, Rylands v. Fletcher,7 5
which had previously been rejected in New Jersey, and ruled that
as a matter of common law, a landowner would be strictly liable
for harm caused by ultrahazardous activity on his property.76 In
effect, the court considered and quantified competing principles
of law, and having assigned greater importance to this common
law principle, the court applied it as a precedent in interpreting
the statute. The court also considered the established rules of
law concerning the separateness of corporate identity and
whether the corporate veil could be pierced under these circumstances.7 7 It held that under the statute, liability would be imposed on prior landowners as well as their corporate agents for
their actions in generating toxic materials on their own property
and for the effects of toxic wastes that in the past caused severe
injury to the property of others. 78
The court's decision is constructively grounded upon principles nourished by legitimate concerns of public policy. As Dworkin himself observed, a rule of law may be properly "generated
by principle and qualified by policy." ' 79 The court's statement
that "[t]hose who poison the land must pay for its cure" 80 articulates a new rule of law fused from precedent, principle, and public policy.
Each of these cases illustrates the decisional process in light
of contemporary jurisprudence. They are examples of "hard
cases," presenting issues not determinable by available precedent or clear rules of law. While they recognize the bedrock of
law at the base of the controversy, they accept the need to move
from that foundation in search of a satisfactory basis for resolving
the dispute. They reflect decisional principles, such as articulate
Id. at 494, 468 A.2d at 160-61.
3 L.R.-H.L. 330 (1868), aff k 1 L.R.-Ex. 265 (1866).
76 See Ventron, 94 N.J. at 488-93, 468 A.2d at 157-60.
77 See id. at 500-01, 468 A.2d at 164.
78 See id. at 503, 468 A.2d at 166.
7-) Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 12, at 1059.
80 Ventron, 94 N.J. at 493, 468 A.2d at 160.
74

75
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consistency and conscious indeterminacy. In varying degrees
and with different emphasis, each decision involves a threshold
analysis of the kinds of issues that are presented for determination, with an initial consideration of clear legal rules and available precedent. Each presents an assessment of relevant, albeit
competing, principles, a confrontation with controversial considerations of public policy as these shade into the deeper concerns
of social and individual morality, and ultimately, a determination
of the grounds that justify the resolution of the underlying issues.

V.

RAMIFICATIONS

Having examined the process of decisional lawmaking
against the landscape of contemporary jurisprudence, we can
consider anew our earlier queries. These, to reiterate, arose
from a concern for courts confronted with public commentary
and criticism in the wake of controversial decisions. This is a
concern that touches upon judicial legitimacy.
Given the premise that most decisional law is firmly based on
clear and established legal doctrine, can courts adequately identify those cases that are "hard"-those that genuinely find existing law inadequate and require creative and novel reasoning in
order to reach a sound disposition? Our examples-Conroy, Kelly,
and Ventron-indicate that courts can make such judgments.
Thus, regardless of the asserted correctness of the results in
these cases, they are properly viewed as hard cases not controlled
by available precedent, cases reasonably demanding the formulation of innovative grounds for decision. The acuteness of the
particular controversies, the urgency of a needed resolution of
the specific conflicts, and the patent inadequacy of conventional
doctrine all suggest that these cases truly required a conscientious exploration of new bases for their dispositions.
A ramification that flows from the thesis of the "hard case" is
whether in the decisional process courts can satisfactorily identify, define, and quantify the reasons that govern the decisional
results. Directly related to this concern is whether a court can
clearly and fully explain its reasoning. If the court so explains its
reasoning, the decision itself should serve as a self-testing measure of its intrinsic soundness. Such a decision should also be a
map showing how far and by what route the court has moved
along a course that will have started fiom a point marked by clear
and fixed rules of law and ended in the thickets of public policy
and social morality. Again, I submit, the examples confirm the
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courts' ability to explore the decisional challenge, fashion a decisional structure, and plot the decisional journey so as to enable
the reader to follow a decision's every turn from a clear beginning to a firm conclusion.
By unfolding the decisional process, a court may in a particular case be perceived as having ventured beyond its appropriate
jurisdictional turf, arguably trenching upon areas that are properly occupied by the legislature or perhaps even by society as a
whole. Gauging the distance the court may have gone entails the
ability to recognize when a particular subject falls clearly within
the exclusive domain of others, and when it falls within overlapping areas of mutual or shared responsibility. Such cases can involve questions or issues of policy, in which individual interests
are overshadowed by community interests and collective ends,
and in which the decision on the issues presented effectively or
necessarily determines such community or collective concerns.
Such determinations will often settle not only the particular individual rights and interests of the litigants whose personal claims
triggered the case, but community or societal interests as well.
Thus, it may be, and often is, that a case and its resultant
decision involve a mix of individual rights and collective interests. Such a case can pose the most difficult decisional challenges
to a court. The challenge can be acute when courts are required
to fashion judicial remedies in order to effectuate or preserve the
individual rights it has determined. The scope of the remedy itself may be tantamount to a policy determination. The effect of
such judicial remedies may constitute, in Dworkin's terminology,
the selection of available means to accomplish what may be perceived as a collective interest as much as it involves the remedial
protection of an individual right. Thus, Mt. Laurel H has as much
to do with remedies as it does with constitutional rights and interests. Robinson v. Cahill is a similar case. When in these cases
the court has enunciated a defensible legal right-in Mt. Laurel H,
the entitlement to affordable housing, in Robinson v. Cahill, the
entitlement to an adequate public education-that right is enjoyed not only by the litigants before the court, but also by
classes of persons comprising a broad stratum of society. The
interest at stake can fairly be considered to encompass a collective end or a societal goal, as well as an individual or group right.
Consequently, the judicial remedy that is devised to protect these
interests constitutes both the vindication of the litigants' rights
and the selection of particular means to achieve a societal goal.
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From this perspective, it is important to understand that such a
decision implicates matters of policy that are legislative and social in character.
The considerations generated by such cases touch upon
questions of governmental and institutional authority and intergovernmental responsibility, initiative, and cooperation. All
branches of government have both competing and interlocking
roles in the effectuation of law. Judicial decisions that are
strongly influenced by or grounded on matters of policy, or
which synthesize policy and moral principles, constitute "law."
While such decisions effectuate law, however, they can also be
catalysts for both legal and social change. They are developmental as well as determinative. Such decisions are intrinsically mutable-susceptible, indeed genetically programmed, to change.
The changes wrought by these decisions can vary in form
and effect. Such change can take the form of an evolving common law. Henningsen, for example, truly gave birth to the modern, judicially crafted legal doctrine of strict liability for
manufactured products. The decision has been credited with
producing a revolutionary transformation in the law of torts.
The right-to-die cases of Quinlan and Conroy and the social-host
case of Kelly v. Gwinnell are examples of cases in which the
grounds of decision incorporate evident policy precepts and
moral values, as well as legal rules and principles. Each effectuates law, providing a legal benchmark against which individuals
can understand and measure their rights and duties and arrange
their conduct accordingly. These decisions also have a developmental prepotency; they have galvanized public attention upon
important issues that implicate public policy and which are particularly amenable to legislative resolution. 8 '
81 The process of legal growth exemplified by these cases is a repetition of the
evolution of the law that was stimulated by the Robinson v. Cahill decision in the field
of public education. Robinson v. Cahill was followed by the Public School Education
Act of 1975, ch. 212, 1975 NJ. Laws 871 (codified as amended at N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 18A:7A-1 to -33 (West Cum. Supp. 1985-1986)). See generally supra note 5. In
Abbott v. Burke,. 100 N.J. 269, 301, 495 A.2d 376, 393 (1985), the court, in dealing
with a constitutional attack upon that statute, held that there should be an exhaustion of administrative remedies to allow full effectuation of the Act, reflecting the
perceived importance of a resolution of issues entailing community or collective
goals by other branches of the government. This process is also similar to the legal
developments that followed the judicial rejection of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Willis v. Department of Conservation & Economic Dev., 55 N.J. 534, 264
A.2d 34 (1970), which was followed by legislation controlling tort claims against
the government. See Tort Claims Act, ch. 45, 1972 N.J. Laws 140 (codified as
amended at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:1-1 to :12-3 (West 1982)). This, in turn, paral-
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One consequence flowing from this thesis is that courts that
have exercised initiative in areas that overlap the legitimate concerns of another branch of government, or society as a whole,
must be prepared to tolerate and consider the differing views of
the other bodies when appropriately and properly expressed.
Depending upon the nature and mix of public and individual issues that are implicated in a given case, a court should be prepared to defend, share, or yield the ground upon which its
decision rests.
Our exposure to jurisprudence also highlights the need to
recognize in the decision of cases issues that may lie at the outermost reaches of public policy, even as these fuse into areas of
morality. Kelly v. Gwinnell could be viewed as a decision in which
policy grounds were strongly influenced by moral values. This, I
suggest, is not necessarily wrong or even inappropriate. Professor Fuller had an insightful way of describing the moral principles judges employ in determining tort liability, a theory that
rested on the notion of duty. In The Morality of Law, he wrote at
length on which societal concerns should and should not be the
subject of legal compulsion. Fuller distinguished between the
morality of aspiration, or the striving for excellence, and the morality of duty. He said:
Where the morality of aspiration starts at the top of
human achievement, the morality of duty starts at the bottom.
It lays down the basic rules without which an ordered society is
impossible, or without which an ordered society directed toward certain specific goals must fail of its mark. It is the morality of the Old Testament and the Ten Commandments. It
speaks in terms of "thou shalt not," and, less frequently, of
"thou shalt." It does not condemn men for failing to embrace
opportunities for the fullest realization of their powers. ,Instead, it condemns them for failing to respect the basic requirements of social living.8 2

leled the judicial abrogation of the doctrine of charitable immunity in Colloppy v.
Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 141 A.2d 276 (1958), which was similarly
followed by legislation. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:53A-7 to -11 (West Cum. Supp.
1985-1986). Most recently, in the controversial area concerning affordable housing, Mount Laurel II was followed by the enactment of the Fair Housing Act, ch. 222,
1985 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. No. 7, at 46 (West). This legislation was recently upheld
by the NewJersey Supreme Court in Hills Dev. Co. v. Township of Bernards, 103
N.J. 1, 510 A.2d 621 (1986). This result exemplifies the court's deference to the
responsibilities of the other branches of government in areas affecting public policy
and community interests and goals.
82 L. FUL.ER, FHE MORALITY OF LAw, supra note 19, at 5-6.
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As we consider the whole range of moral issues, we may conveniently imagine a kind of scale or yardstick which begins at
the bottom with the most obvious demands of social living'and
extends upward to the highest reaches of human aspiration.
Somewhere along this scale there is an invisible pointer that
marks the dividing line where the pressure of duty leaves off
and the challenge of excellence begins. The whole field of
moral argument is dominated
by a great undeclared war over
83
the location of this pointer.

It is fair to conclude that there is a framework within which a
court must act if it is to act 'esponsibly. This framework, structured
from the elements ofjurisprudence, must account for the appropriate recognition of the character of the case a court is called upon to
decide and for a sound methodology for a court to follow in reaching its determination. In addition to acting responsibly within this
framework, courts must also be perceived as acting responsibly; in
this sense, courts must be accountable. This entails intellectual candor, clarity, and completeness. The public should be able to understand readily and fully what the courts are doing and why they are
doing it.
The integrity of judicial decisions has to do with determining
cases in this way. A valid judicial decision is one that holds no
secrets or hidden meanings, that inspires confidence that it is right
as well as correct, sound as well as accurate, complete as well as
focused, comprehensive as well as pointed, fair as well as wise, and
tolerant as well as decisive. It should reflect a sense of justice that
is, in a word, prudential. Will not judicial legitimacy come unbeckoned to a court that has grasped its responsibilities in this way?
83

Id. at 9-10.

